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Article 5

Book Reviews
Beautiful Theories: The Spectacle of Discourse in Contemporary Criticism by
Elizabeth Bruss. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982. Pp. 519. $30.00
This is a learned, moving, beautifuly written book. It is somewhat too long,
causing the reader a bit of frustration. But it merits the effort of a sustained
reading, and by its very length and lushness succeeds in focusing our attention on its proclaimed subject: the pleasure of reading (and writing) literary
theory and the "spectacle of discourse" that contemporary theory offers.
Bruss's own discourse, even while admirably clear and sensible, displays
some of the same self-consciousness, the same "rhetorical cunning" (p. 59)
and the same sense of crisis about language and values, whether ethical or
aesthetic, that she sees as the hallmarks of contemporary critical writing, and
that make contemporary criticism, according to her, tend toward the status of
literature.
Bruss starts her book from the following proposition: Contemporary criticism has become a form of literature, blurring the traditional boundaries between "fine writing" (or "primary text") and the ostensibly more pedestrian,
"subordinate" commentaries on it. This is not a particularly original idea, nor
does Bruss claim that it is. She points out that the current awareness of the
intertextuality of all writing makes it "hard to disdain [criticism] as a parasitic
text, if [literature] is equally involved in commenting on other texts .... This
elevates the status of criticism from- parasite to partner ... ." (p. 65). What
strikes me as most valuable in Bruss's enterprise is not this founding ideawhich has become almost too familiar a topos in contemporary critical
thought-nor is it her extremely thoughtful account of why and how theory
acceded to its current "literary" status over the past twenty years or so
(Chapter One: "Theory of Literature Becomes Theory as Literature"); it is not
even her detailed attempt to present a systematic approach to the reading of
literary theory (Chapter Two: "Entrances to the Theoretical Text"). Rather,
the value of her book lies in its own enactment of how (and correlatively,
why) one might proceed to read and write theory as literature.
Bruss makes us realize, through her own writing about her reading of certain theoretical and critical texts, that what readers most appreciate-or, as
the case may be, react against-in a piece of critical writing is not its "truth"
or validity but their "first impression of the power or delicacy of mind that
informs the theory" (p. 117). This is not quite the same as saying (as Bruss
does earlier) that the multiplicity of today's conflicting theories provokes a
tendency in the reader "to defer attempts to test or apply them and to simply
contemplate them as conceptual structures" (p. 70). It is not when theory can
be contemplated aesthetically, as a quasi-autonomous form independent of
usefulness or validity, that it attains the status of literature. Theory becomes
literature (is read as literature) when it displays the presence of an active
mind to whose power and delicacy (or lack thereof) the reader responds.
Actually, Bruss never makes this claim explicit. She might even object to it,
as an out-and-out statement. {It is, after all, a rather "old-fashioned" view:
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literature as the display of mind, reading as a meeting of minds). And yet, it
is my appreciation precisely of the quality of mind displayed by her prose
that has remained with me most after reading her book. Take a sentence like
this one: "Indeed, taxonomy might be read as a willed violence practiced on
the density of the world as we experience it, an exercize in controlled and
strictly parsed responsiveness" (p. 103). The thought it expresses is intelligent, perhaps even profound. But it is above all the felicity of phrasing, the
happy choice of words ("strictly parsed responsiveness") that strikes me and
makes me wish to continue reading, so as to get to know better the mind responsible for them.
When it comes to Bruss's reading of other critics, one notes the same careful attention to nuances, the same loving lingering over stylistic details, that
characterize her own writing. And one notes, too, that what Bruss responds
to most strongly, in the work of a critic, is the overall quality and nature of
the mind it displays. After the first two general chapters, which I mentioned
earlier, the bulk of her book consists of long (they could have been shortened
somewhat) individual chapters devoted to William Gass, Susan Sontag, Harold Bloom, and Roland Barthes, all of whom interest her because of the "hybrid" nature of their writing: Gass and Sontag being novelists who are better
known (and, according to Bruss, are aesthetically more successful) as theorists
or essayists, while Bloom's and Barthes's theoretical essays are clearly
marked attempts to endow theory with the aesthetic qualities-figurality,
ambiguity, drama, sensuality-of literature. Although Bruss ranges over all of
their work (up to 1980) and is interested in the evolution of their writing and
thought, the "narrative" aspect of her discussions is subordinated to a more
synchronic or descriptive approach, so that what emerges is more akin to an
intellectual/stylistic/psychological "portrait" of the critic than to a "biography" (I'm thinking of Michel Beaujour's useful distinction between autoportrait and autobiography).
This synchronic/descriptive tendency is especially evident in the chapters
on Sontag and Barthes. Certainly Bruss insists on their evolution-in Sontag's case from the purely aestheticizing stance of Against Interpretation to the
more ethically urgent stance of On Photography and Illness as Metaphor, in
Barthes's case from the "classical" or scientific semiology of his work of the
1960's to what she calls the aestheticized, "excessive" semiology of his later
works. In both chapters, however, what we ultimately end up with is a general characterization of the critic's personal style, which is (as Proust put it)
not only a matter of language, but of "vision"-or perhaps what I have been
calling mind. Thus Bruss writes about Sontag's prose, in what I consider a
brilliant characterization, that it eschews tropes other than hyperbole and
"ornaments itself by rearranging words-through ellipses, parenthetic
clauses, parallelisms, selective repetitions, antitheses, and an occasional
chiasmus-in ways that leave the literal meaning intact.... The result is a
writing with a peculiar quality of naked insistence" (p. 267). About Barthes,
she writes, once again using the generalizing present tense: "Barthes's writing.
strives to make itself vulnerable (to dispute, qualification, remonstrance) rather than 'recuperable' (useful as a weapon in the war of words).
Vulnerability is a function of being open to inspection, so that inconsistencies
will inevitably be discovered" (p. 458).
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Bruss is so fair-minded and sympathetic to all four of her subjects (with the
possible exception of Harold Bloom, which I will come to) that one becomes
aware only gradually of her personal preferences, which often emerge indirectly by delayed comparisons and juxtapositions. Thus it is only toward the
end of the essay on Gass that she remarks, critically: " ... it is sometimes difficult to understand where the air of daring-do and embattled discovery,
which is everywhere in [his] essays, could be coming from. Most, if not all, of
these opinions have enjoyed a long history among academic critics" (p. 186).
And it is only in her discussion of Sontag's "substantial" theorizing, as opposed to Gass's more narrowly "formal" claims for literature, that one realizes Bruss's greater sympathy for the former (p. 222). Indeed, one of the
things she most admires in Sontag is her daring to take on broad issues, her
willingness to make bold pronouncements even at the risk of being wrong, or
of writing against herself later: "to work at risk, and to dare and almost invite
inconsistency, is part of the economy of Sontag's enterprise. Hers is, after all,
a theory ... that shapes its new positions by opposing its old enthusiasmsand thus prepares itself for its own obsolescence" (p. 242).
The most dramatic juxtaposition Bruss stages, however, is between Bloom
and Barthes. She gives a persuasive demonstration of the underlying conservatism and "macho" aggressiveness of Bloom's theory of poetry, which she
opposes in the last chapter to Barthes's increasingly fluid, self-questioning,
non-assertive mode of thought and writing. With devastating thoroughness
and an occasional touch of humor (at one point she calls Bloom "the Norman
Mailer of our speculative prose"-p. 312), she shows that Bloom's theory,
elaborated in the tetralogy beginning with The Anxiety of Influence and ending with Poetry and Repression, is based on a browbeating rhetoric, the terroristic strategy of a self too afraid of its own weaknesses to admit any
opposition. Bruss writes: "the result [of Bloom's notions of defense and
repression] is of a consciousness that is wholely self-serving, cunning in its
devotion to a certain saving ignorance, strong to the extent that it can cover
all traces of its weakness and aware only to the extent of what it cares to
know. Such a self is condemned to a constant, paranoiac whirligig of mastery
and slavery" (p. 328). The elegance of her prose does not hide her distaste
for a theory founded entirely on the notion of power. Nor does she disguise
her lack of sympathy for what she sees as the ideologically conservative cast
of Bloom's view of literary history: the canon of "classics" as a closed and
decaying system, incapable of real innovation and ultimately subservient to
the past ("curiously, in this ostensibly antithetical theory, the ground for our
current practices is our ancestors' practice" -po 359).
One could object that Bruss perhaps overstates the case against Bloomhis views may be less monolithic than she claims. My own sense, however, is
that within the logic and economy of her book, the case against Bloom makes
sense. One cannot, and should not, read a great deal of theory without developing theoretical allegiances and positions of one's own. Bruss's celebration
of Barthes contra Bloom is a sign of her own preference for an open-ended,
delicately nuanced and allusive, rather than an oracular or hortatory kind of
writing about (writing as) literature. Mozart rather than Wagner, as it were.
One could see in this preference on Bruss's part a veiled or implicit feminism, which remains unarticulated, perhaps even unconscious. Unfortu-
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nately, we will never know the next stage of her thinking. She died at age
37, while completing final revisions of Beautiful Theories. The reader, informed of this fact by a prefatory note, cannot help reading the book as a testament, a statement by someone with whom no further dialogue is possible.
And yet, the voice and mind remain, displayed on every page.
Harvard University

Susan Rubin Suleiman

Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction by Robert C. Holub. New York:
Methuen, Inc., 1984. Pp. xiv + 189. $18.95, Cloth; $8.95, Paper.

During the last decade, Anglo-American literary criticism seems to have
settled into two distinct camps. Traditional, "tweed-jacket" scholars have
embraced the comfortable tenets of old New criticism, arguing that meaning
resides in the work, having been located there by the author, and that the
critic's task is to recover that original determinate meaning. Fashionably radical scholars, on the other hand, have embraced the less comfortable tenets of
poststructuralism, arguing that meaning resides in the reader; therefore, the
critics's task is to formulate a meaning based on innumerable semantic and
aesthetic "codes." While these synopses are obviously over-simplified, they
do reveal the philosophical distance separating the traditional monist critics
from the modem pluralist critics. Many scholar-critics are likely to wonder if
some middle ground exists on which they may practice a criticism which permits pluralism with constraints, a pluralism which escapes subjectivism.
This middle ground appears with Robert C. Holub's new study, Reception
Theory: A Critical Introduction. This book does not tout a brand-new critical
approach; rather, as the title implies, it critically introduces to the scholarly
community an approach which has been practiced with some variations in
Germany and the United States since 1969. The alert scholar-critic might recognize a similarity between "reception theory" and "reader-response theory," a term used in Anglo-American critical circles since the early 1970's. The
recognition is justified; with their focus on the reader as the crucial figure in
the world-author-work-reader paradigm, both reception theory and readerresponse theory attempt to revise the way in which we view reading. However, as Holub deftly demonstrates, reception theory is a more cohesive
approach than reader-response theory. Although minor differences exist between the principal reception theorists-Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang
Iser-these are mere cavils compared to the differences among such readerresponse theorists as Stanley Fish, Norman Holland, and Michael Rifaterre.
Their evaluation of the reader is commendable, even necessary, but their respective techniques expose them to accusations of subjectivism. While reception theory is not entirely exempt from such accusations, as Holub is quick to
point out, it does provide scholar-critics with a platform for practicing criticism which is pluralistic but not subjectivistic.
Holub states his purpose succinctly: "The main purpose of the following
study is to introduce reception theory to those who have little or no knowledge of German" (p. xiv). This is a modest claim which needs some amplifi-
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cation. Holub does not limit himself to a discussion of the major works of
reception theory, most of which are available in English. Instead, he introduces to the reader early essays which have not been translated, thereby giving the reader a sense of reception theory's origins and evolution. Moreover,
he examines such important domestic and foreign influences on reception
theory as Russian Formalism and Prague structuralism. Finally, he evenhandedly discusses such alternative models and controversies as Marxist reception theory and empirical reception theory, ending with a consideration of
problems and perspectives. Thus, while Holub's stated purpose can be accepted at face value, we learn that he means a great deal in proposing to "introduce reception theory."
Holub's historical and evolutionary perspectives are illuminating. His first
chapter begins with an account of Jauss's "revolutionary" essay of 1969,
"The change in the paradigm of literary scholarship/' and he ponders the
rapid growth in popularity of reception theory, not only in literary scholarship but also in art criticism. He suggests that reception theory arose, as Jauss
intimates, in response to a crisis in literary studies compounded of "exhaustion" of old methods and "discontent" in general (p. 7). Yet Holub avoids
confounding symptoms with reasons, and he suggests that reception theory's
appeal was due largely to its flexibility in dealing with canonical dilemmas
and its ability to accomodate modern literature with its growing appeal to
reader response. He acknowledges that "the various aspects of German social
life constitute the conditions of possibility for the formulation, acceptance,
and popularity" of reception theory, and he concurs with Jauss's observation,
"Methods do not fan from the sky, but have their place in history" (p. 12).
That historical position is established in Holub's second chapter, on influences and precursors, which he begins by suggesting that "the entire tradition of rhetoric and its relationship to poetic theory" can be seen as a
precursor due to its "focus on the impact of oral and written communication
on the listener or reader" (p. 13). Nevertheless, he concentrates on five influences which deserve precursor status because they had a significant impact
on theoretical developments during the 1960's, or because they contributed
to solving the crisis in literary scholarship by refocusing attention on the textreader relationship. He cites Russian Formalism because it widened the concept of form to include aesthetic perception, defined the work of art as the
sum of its "devices," and directed attention to the process of interpretation itself. He names Roman Ingarden because he drew attention to the literary
work as a phenomenon of pure intentionality and perceived reading as a process in which the reader attempts to resolve textual indeterminacies in order
to actualize a work's meaning. He includes Prague structuralism because it
identified art as a signifying system and because it identified the recipient of
the system as a product of social relations. He lists Hans-Georg Gadamer as a
precursor for his insistence on the historical nature of understanding and the
inescapability of prejudice in the act of understanding. Finally, Holub identifies sociology of literature as an influence due to its interest in the relationship between literature and the public.
Having identified the foundations on which reception theory rests, Holub
discusses the major theorists in Chapter 3. His appreciation for Jauss and Iser
is apparent, but not uncritical, for he acknO\dedges that their theories ha\'e
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flaws. He points out such problems as Jauss's inconsistency in adopting objectivity as a methodological principle while trying to escape the positivisthistoricist paradigm (p. 60), and Iser's tendency to remove terms from their
usual contexts and force them to function in his "transcendental model" of
the act of reading (p. 101). These observations alone would justify Holub's
work, but he provides an additional perspective by presenting alternative
models and controversies in Chapter 4. He summarizes Jauss's and Iser's current theoretical positions and outlines the objections raised by former disciples as well as Marxist critics. This section is particularly lively; Holub
captures the polemical tenor of the east-west debate and suggests that while
Jauss and Iser are jusified in criticizing the determinism of the CDR model,
"the problem of what the text demands and what the reader supplies still
remains" (p. 133). Holub concludes this chapter with a discussion of empirical reception theory and its attempts to quantify actual readers' responses to
texts, suggesting that although such methods might appear as vestiges of a
"superannuated scientism," they may be useful. Holub's fifth chapter, on
problems and perspectives, is contentious and stimulating, for he observes
that reception theory seems to have stagnated since 1976. Yet he concludes
that reception theory has had enormous impact on notions of textual stability
and the identity of the reader. Finally, he suggests that reception theory
might renew its vitality by entering into a dialogue with French and American critical discourse: "if it can enter into a productive relationship with other
modes of contemporary thought, reception theory could again provide ... a
welcome 'provocation' to literary scholarship" (p. 163).
Throughout this book Holub is lucid and lively, perhaps most lucid when
he surveys the influences on reception theory and most lively when he describes the social context in which reception theory emerged and the current
east-west debate. His thoroughness and clarity suggest that Holub's audience
is not restricted to established scholar-critics, but encompasses graduate students as well as advanced undergraduates. Having been "introduced" to reception theory, these readers will appreciate the fecundity of this approach
and perhaps initiate the kind of dialogue Holub encourages. Such a dialogue
might well infuse new dynamism into literary scholarship, with the added
advantage of promoting an approach more accessible to readers, thus enlarging the community which sustains humanistic inquiry.

University of Florida·

Michael Eckert

Chaucer and the Imagery of Narrative: The First Five Canterbury Tales by V.A.
Kolve. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984. pp. 551. $39.50.
If methods had mottos, the one I'd choose for Kolve's approach to Chaucer's Canterbury Tales in Chaucer and the Imagery of Narrative might be his
own terse dictum, "Context governs." Contexts do govern here, ranging from
the local details of narrative surface in individual tales, through the interface
of the tales with one another within the larger metaphor of the fictive and figural pilgrimage, to the intellectual milieu of the middle ages that provides
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the focal context for this book: the visual arts and the iconographic traditions
embedded therein. Kolve's premise is that "a knowledge of the symbOlic traditions current in the visual arts of the later Middle Ages can clarify and
deepen our response to [Chaucer's] narrative poems," and this book, which
takes us through close and often subtle readings of The Knight's Tale, The
Miller's Tale, The Reeve's Tale, The Cook's fragment, and The Man of Law's
Tale, is in part a demonstration of that proposition.
Kolve's entree to these tales is through what he calls "narrative images,"
images that he deems crucial to an understanding of the tale as a whole. Excluded are "the passing metaphor or simile." "i1l)agery as rhetorical decoration," and "local iconographic detail" -images that have a traditional
symbolic resonance but do not "become a center of meaning for the entire
poem." His concern is with "those larger images created by the narrative action itself, which it invites us to imagine and hold in mind as we experience
the poem, and which later serve as memorial centers around which we are
able to reconstruct the story and think appropriately about its meaning." The
theoretical bases upon which this approach is constructed, limned in Chapters I and II, are medieval faculty psychology, specifically the pride of place it
assigned to the visual image, to "seeing as a way of knowing," and "the
learned language of visual sign" that conveyed knowledge symbolically .
. Kolve contends that "even ordinary members of Chaucer's audience would
have known a whole repertory of such signs/' and one of his goals is to provide a sort of iconographic primer for the modem reader through exploration
of the visual and literary contexts for the central images of each tale.
There appears to be a methodological agenda here as well. Although he is
too mannerly to say so, what Kolve is offering is a tactful corrective, a revisionist version of iconocentric interpretation. He presents a mode of access,
but emphatically not a system. In both theory and application, Kolve seeks to
resist the siren call of reductiveness. Key terms are "being like," and "suggestive likeness"; he insists that we recognize the play and interplay of surface
and subsurface, the marriage of symbolic significance with "the literal meaning of things," the whole that emerges from the "assimilation of the iconographic to the mimetic."
Kolve's readings are noteworthy for the deftness with which they do manage to account for symbolic traditions while simultaneously respecting the
quiddity of each tale. Whether or not we agree with Kolve's interpretations,
or even accept as central those images he chooses for foregrounding, his
readings provide a valuable model, a sampler, of the varied ways in which
the mimetic and the iconographic can relate to one another, of the varied
ways in which symbolic traditions can be called into play, and the varied
functions they may serve, suggesting that the language of visual signs has a
grammar as potentially complex and manipulable as written or spoken language. For example, an image initiated as purely mimetic may modulate in
the course of a narrative from the phYSical to the metaphysical, from local
detail to thematic centrality, such as the prison in the Knight's Tale, which
first appears as the tower where Palamon and Arcite are incarcerated, and
gradually accretes figural connotations until it evolves into "this foule prisoun of this lyf." Or, as in The Man of Law's Tale, two individual but intimately related images, dominating the narrative action (here the "rudderless
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ship and the sea"), may coalesce into an iconographic compound, forming a
nexus of all previous inherited meanings, used in traditional, expected ways,
for traditional, didactic purposes, but richly generative. Or a given image may
be used to simultaneously call up and pervert its usual meanings, a kind of
deliberate iconographic mispronunciation, such as that uttered by the Reeve
in his prologue, when he takes the image of wine pouring through the tap of
an open cask, traditionally associated with merrymaking, and converts it to a
bleak image of impending death ("Deeth drough the tappe of lyf and leet it
gon"), thus revealing, Kolve suggests, the Reeve's own bitter pessimism and
limited vision. Elsewhere the symbolic potential of an image, or set of images, may be wilfully eschewed. Kolve argues that in the Miller's Tale, for example, Chaucer invokes the image of Noah and the Flood, with its inherited
baggage of theological significances, in such a way as to deflect iconographic
resonance, using it contrastively for comic purposes. Likewise, the series of
animal images used to describe the members of the amorous triangle, which
might have been expected to function in traditional ways to signal moral
states or theological commonplaces, are here used, Kolve feels, in their mimetic sense only, to convey the vitality of the young protagonists. Sometimes
a candle is a candle.
Kolve does not demand assent to his readings; indeed, in a winningly
Chaucerian disclaimer in his conclusion, he avers that far from attempting to
offer a "definitive account of narrative imagery," what he has given is
"finally no more than a reading of the Canterbury Tales: one reader's account
of his experience." This disclaimer is certainly disarming, but perhaps also
misleading, for Kolve's undertaking in this book is considerably more ambitious than either the title or the above precis might imply. As he states himself in the Introduction, his readings are "linked by their approach through
imagery, but not limited solely to that subject"; and even when imagery is
the subject, the traditions are established not only through the visual arts, but
through a wide range of medieval literary genres: theology, poetry, history,
drama, encyclopedias. But beyond that, this is not just a reading of some
Canterbury Tales, nor is its sale subject iconographic tradition. A second book,
in essence, sprouts from the one already accounted for, different from it in
both mode and execution: an argument for the re-visioning of the first unit of
the Canterbury Tales to include the Man of Law's Tale not only as part of, but
as the necessary climax to, the first series of stories in the CT.
Kolve wants to see the Man of Law's Tale as a "re-beginning" within-and
a mirroring of-the larger structure of the CT. The foundation for this argument is laid in Chapter VI, an interesting if less tidy and more provocative
chapter than those preceding it, which appropriately marks a kind of rebeginning for this book. After speculating on the possible directions the
Cook's Tale might have taken had it been completed (Kolve's guess is that it
would have been characterized by a "self-conscious appropriation of moral
values by a rising, trade-oriented middle class"), Kolve comes to the crux of
his argument, which focuses on three areas: evidence for and against assigning the Man of Law's Introduction, Prologue, and Tale to a separate unit (Fragment l1/B') on the assumption that it marks the start of the second leg of
the pilgrimage; the Host's remarks concerning wasting time in "ydelnesse";
and the puzzling attack by the Sergeant of the Lawe on Chaucer's previous
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works. The argument runs something like this: Adducing both MS and textual evidence, Kolve asserts that there is no reason to assume that either
Chaucer or the CT scribes conceived of these passages as separated from the
previous tales. Thus the Host's remarks, usually perceived as implying dilatoriness in beginning the second day's story-telling, may be recontextualized;
the time to which the Host refers is not the clock time of the fictional pilgrimage, but rather the "irrecoverable time" of the soul's pilgrimage through
life, and the "ydelnesse" he condemns refers to the triviality, or moral vacuity or truncated Christian vision, of the tales related thus far: none has
"address[ed] in any serious way the Christian truth that made pilgrimage a
hallowed institution as well as a central metaphor for man's life on earth."
The Man of Law's attack on Chaucer's works, described by Kolve as a "mock
palinode" (serving, together with the MLT, as "the first in a series of selfcorrections" which culminates in the Retraction), reinforces this view by singling out for condemnation only those works with classical/pagan subject
matter, i.e. those which perforce exclude Christian experience and Christian
vision.
This repudiation of what has gone before, in both the immediate context of
the CT and the larger context of Chaucer's poetic oeuvre, invites "a new beginning," with the Host calling for "a tale that will confirm the ordered ends
of human life, the possibility of human virtue, and the human need to use
time well, if we would enter into the joy of heaven." The Man of Law's rale
responds to that call, by "mov[ing] the pilgrim audience into areas of human
experience and Christian affirmation, unexpressed until this moment in the
pilgrimage journey." Rejecting the standard view that the portrayal of the
Man of Law is intended to be taken as wholly ironic, rejecting also the generic descriptions of the MLT as a tale of marvels or sentimental fiction,
Kolve asserts that the story of Custance would have been perceived by its
earlier audiences as history, not fiction, and thus provides a "sense of pilgrimage rooted in historical time"; its purpose is "to explore the past in ways
exemplary to the present." Kolve also sees the tale functioning as a vehicle
for exploring the possibilities of poetry itself by showing that poetry "can
serve truth directly, without benefit of fiction."
If much of this takes us rather far afield from the ostensible goals of this
study, it serves nonetheless as a necessary bridge to Kolve's reading of the
Man of Law's Tale itself, which, returning to the matter of iconographic tradition, elegantly illustrates his seminal thesis, and unifies the book as a whole
by fulfilling a design that only now overtly reveals itself. In retrospect, it becomes apparent that much of the book has been preparing, subtextually at
least, for this conclusion: that Kolve's readings of each individual tale (e.g.
his contention that the philosophical core of the Knight's Tale stops short of a
complete Boethian consolation, trapping its pagan protagonists in a nonredemptive deterministic universe) have been governed in part by his perception of the sequentiality of the tales and their larger meaning within the
structure of the Canterbury Tales as a whole.
Although Chaucerians will undoubtedly find much to argue with here, and
some readers may find Kolve's presentation overscrupulous, this book offers
many pleasures, not the least of which is a particularly felicitous conjunction
of poet and critic. It's a handsome production, lucidly written, impressively
I
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researched, generous with both information and illustrations (none, alas, in
color)-a book to revert to for any number of reasons, a book for owning.
More's the pity, then, that the depressing economics of academic publishing
will probably relegate most copies to libraries', not scholars' shelves.

Wayne State University

Elizabeth S. Sklar

The Character of Swift's Satire: A Revised Focus, edited by Claude Rawson.
Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983. Pp. 343. $34.50.
Swift's Narrative Satires: Author and Authority by Everett Zimmerman. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 183. $19.50
The subtitle of Claude Rawson's collection, The Character of Swift's Satire: A
Revised Focus, is a more amusing joke before one slaps down the purchase
price for the volume. The revision, it turns out, is less "focused" on the character of Swift's satire than on a previous collection edited by Rawson, Focus:
Swift (London, 1971). Rawson has retired a few essays, retained others,
added several, and reissued the whole with another press.
A collection of this sort, with essays printed at various times in various
places, is bound to be a bit of a grab bag. Not only are some of the pieces
appreciably better than others, but essays that might have once breathed fire
in the rage of battle now merely puff smoke. Whatever the unevenness of the
volume, the process of reformulating the collection must have been mildly
interesting for Rawson. One imagines Swiftians, like veteran ballplayers,
waiting for their options to be picked up or despairing as their contracts are
dropped. Rawson's reediting is judicious enough. He has kept his own long
introductory essay, John Traugott's important piece on A Tale of A Tub, an essay of Ian Watt's first read as a Clark Library Paper on irony in 1956, an essay by Irvin Ehrenpreis on Swift's letters, and an essay version of a 1967
tercentenary B. B. C. talk on Swift's Anglo-lrishness by J. c. Beckett.
The essays from the original collection Rawson has chosen to remove seem
neither a serious nor conspicuous loss. New essays cover the terrain vacated
by the old, and, if these are not remarkably "new" fashioned, they at least
display a current awareness of Swift studies, which, I suppose, is one of the
reasons Rawson disinterred this project in the first place. To name names
without casting aspersions, the following have essays removed: D. W. Jefferson, W. A. Speck, Charles Peake, and John Traugott (who, of course, also has
one kept). The following authors have essays added: Pat Rogers on the Swiftian cliche, Richard Feingold on the rhetoric of Swift's poetry, F. P. Lock on
the politics of 1701-14, Jenny Mezciems on Renaissance prototypes for the
Travels, and Ricardo Quintana reviewing recent Swift criticism. Of the new
essays, Rogers' and Feingold's strike me as the most spirited. Lock's essay is
an oddity in the sense that it reads as prefatory to a case that he never
makes, though he does make the case in his book on the politics of Gulliver's
Travels. This essay (more like an excerpt) treats obvious political material
without any discernible reason for doing so.
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Among the retained essays two share pride of place, Rawson's own long
work on Swift's satiric characteristics, which he revised, and John Traugott's
essay on A Tale of A Tub, which seems unrevised (the notes cite nothing later
than 1963). Of the two, Rawson's ranging piece covers many more works
and makes contact in a more calculated way with the actual issues and
events that absorbed Swift's attention, though Rawson's central point about
the kind of mental earthquake that constituted Swift's shakey stance on matters owes much to Traugott's work on the psycho-historical and sexual
strains of imaginative battiness and frenzy in A Tale of A Tub. Traugott's
Swift is a kind of Rameau's nephew with just enough composure to mime
himself into print. The gist of both Rawson's and.Traugott's positions (well
summarized, by the way, in a note to Richard Feingold's essay in this volume) locates the "mind" of Swift dispersed in variety of prejudices, symptoms, and exuberant tics. The issue for them is not so much what Swift
believed about particular things uttered in his works by voices we mayor
may not trust as it is about the overlayering of rhetoric, psychology, sexuality, public pontification and private physiology, from which it is impossible
and undesirable to pinpoint a Single, rational, controlled, balanced Swiftian
perspective. Rawson and Traugott express this view with glee-they make
no brief for a Swiftian apologetics since they link Swift's power to the very
things that the apologists would want to apologize for. Yet their arguments,
probably because many more Swiftians now agree with them, seem less startling than they were two decades ago. This wouldn't bear mentioning except
that Rawson and, to a lesser extent, his contributors are trying to recapitalize
an old venture.
On a related matter, it ought to be said that Traugott's essay in particular,
as good as it is, is disturbing in its tone. Perhaps its strategies were less objectionable when a younger Traugott, fertile of insight and venomous of expression, felt he had to stalk the likes of such Swiftian compromisers as the now
deceased Kathleen Williams. But viciousness doesn't wear well, especially
when couched in petulance, and, intelligence alone is no license for this essayist's circling round other commentators as if they were critical carrion.
One expects sustained intelligence from any work of Everett Zimmerman
and his compact study, Swift'S Narrative Satires, provides just that. Zimmerman's book is about two narrative satires, A Tale of A Tub and Gulliver's
Travels, although other books by other authors, namely Erasmus, Montaigne,
and Sir Thomas More, put in token appearances. While Zimmerman claims
that his mission is in part historical-he wishes to place Swift's satires in
their hermeneutical and epistemological contexts-the real worth of his project, it seems to me, resides elsewhere. Zimmerman argues that, despite their
differences, Swift's major narratives forecast the future obsession in the century (and forever after) with the authority of narrative voice. This was, according to Zimmerman, the almost inevitable result of the generic,
epistemological, and hermeneutical pressures generated from both inside and
outside Swift's work. What in Swift are a set of incapacitating problems for
narrators who write through their idiosyncratic desires and perceptions, who
are authors of the structures that contain them, become the very conventions
that will serve the evolving novel in England later in the century.
Zimmerman does not wish to unbalance his own perspective and he claims

318

Criticism, Vol. XXVII, no. 3, Book Reviews

at the onset that the "argument in my book is not, however, designed to redraw the generic lines of novel and satire but to explore the strategic position
of Swift's satires in relation to major developments in intellectual history and
narrative" (p. 12). But I am not sure exactly how he can do the latter without
touching on the former, and, despite his demur, the relation between Swift's
narrative satires and the opportunities in the period for later experiments in
novelistic authority is very much a part of the hidden agenda of Zimmerman's book. Though Zimmerman rarely mentions the novel fonn in detail
and Swift did not live long enough to read most of the important eighteenthcentury English novels other than Defoe's, there is always an implied dialectic in this book between Swift's protean narratives and the destiny that
turned out to be the novel's choice.
Zimmerman defines his interests early: the materials or stuff of narration
by which a narrator establishes the self's relation with the world; the transformations of literary forms to accommodate the individual characteristics of
the narrator; the relation of narrative form and narrative voice to the way information is taken in (epistemology) and the way it is meant to be dished out
(hermeneutics). Whatever else Zimmerman examines as influencing, pressuring, or infuriating Swift, he is never far from analyzing the issue of narrative
voice and its potential to unsettle the stability of generic forms. The dislocations of intellect and genre in Swift's works produce instances in which ego
confuses polemic or madness disrupts travel. The way Swift's narrators are,
in a way, misinformed by the new means of assessing information and the
new circuits along which information travels in the later seventeenth and
earlier eighteenth centuries is always a matter for Swiftian derision: "epistemology represented in Swift's satires is negative" (p. 108).
What unity Swift's satire achieves is through the categoric disunity of the
ideologies and forms it imitates: "Swift's critique of the intellectual movements of his time is conducted through his transmutations of inherited literary forms" (p. 14). And it is the emphases and suppressions of particular
narrators that "activate the unstable elements" (p. 114) along and across generic borders. Swift's generic marauding makes any conventional definition
of his satire futile. The neoaristotelian position that satire must have an external referent and cannot take as its subject things like narrative voice, or the
moral position that satirists must operate from an assured perspective are
treated with politeness by Zimmerman, but he believes neither view and
gives neither any quarter. Tant mieux.
Zimmerman has another project in mind for his book: distinguishing the
narrative qualities that differentiate A Tale of A Tub and Gulliver's Travels.
Easy summary is not possible here because the argument is carried by long
exposition, but essentially Zimmerman sees in the Tale a narrative strategy
ego maniacal in dimension and a narrator with "a raw and inexorable demand for gratification" (p. 56). Gulliver, on the other hand, not only grows
into his dementia, but has to remember what his relative sanity must have
been like in order to record his more restrained and conventional earlier
travelling self. Hence the initial problem for the Tale is to identify its voice;
the initial problem for the Travels is not to be tricked by its imitation of
objective adventure. Zimmerman is epigrammatic: "A Tale of A Tub parodies
the text that accretes authority from a prior text, the Travels the text that ac-
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quires authority from its literal rendering of nature. The Tale mimes an attempt to subsume all other claims to authority, the Travels an attempt to
supplant all other claims to authority" (p. 23)
Zimmerman's chapters on the Tale and the Travels corne in matched sets,
though he shifts their order. The first two chapters on the Tale are: "Hermeneutics of Self" and "Subduing a Literary Form." For the Travels the chapters
reverse: "Subduing a Literary Form" and "The Language of Self." Interpretation is prior in the Tale because the narrator imitates only the endless idea of
the text; interpretation is secondary in the Travels because we think we know
what we are getting. The author's bona fides in the Tale are precisely his disintegrated intellectual capacities; in the Travels Gulliver goes haywire piecemeal as part of the remarkable forbearance that allows him to pretend for the
purposes of writing the earlier books that he was not as distracted as he was
at the time he dropped the manuscript off at his publisher's. (The same
would still be the case even if the whole of the Travels were a figment of
Gulliver's madness.) All of this is mirrored in the arrangement of Zimmerman's chapters where self precedes genre for the Tale and genre precedes self
for the Travels. The "mad" author of the Travels has to get just enough hold
on himself to get the sequence right; the narrator of A Tale of A Tub has the
sole task of being himself.
The last set of chapters is identical for the Tale and for the Travels: "Epistemological Foundations." It is as if foundations, at least for Swift's narrative
satires, can come last. Zimmerman in these chapters performs as literary historian, and though his work is sound it is not as generative as elsewhere. The
authors treated here have been thoroughly worked over before in relation to
Swift-Lucretius, Erasmus, More, Montaigne, Hobbes, Locke, transactors of
the Royal Society-and Zimmerman adds little really new. There is the further risk in argument by analogue that parallel interests turn into definitive
influences. Sometimes they do, but sometimes they don't. And in the rush to
get all the old information, as well as the new, on the table for this last set of
chapters, we witness a kind of Mechanical Operation of the Scholar. I cite the
following on Swift's view of history not because it is demonstrably untrue
but because, true or not, it strikes me as "Tale" chasing. "The problem of ascertaining Swift's views is further complicated by the fact that neither Swift
nor Temple held the belief in the earth's decline that Wotton attributed to
Temple. Swift's views must be disentangled not only from Temple's views
but also from Wotton's version of Temple if we are not to fall into the trap of
regarding him as opposed to all recent knowledge," (p. 105).
But it is not fair to Zimmerman to end with him caught in a vicious Swiftian circle. For the most part, he is a critic capable of saying things that do
not sound foolish or petulant about Swift's most difficult works, and saying
these things with enough tact to see their implications for narrative beyond
the scope of Swift's satires and beyond the scope of this book that portrays
the nature of Swift's narrative satires so well.

Columbia University

Michael Seidel
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William Godwin, by Peter H. Marshall. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1984. Pp. xi + 497. $30.00
Peter Marshall concludes his excellent study of the life and work of William Godwin with the judgment that Godwin is "a rare example of a man
who excelled in both philosophy and literature," and "stands forth as an authentic human being, a truly creative writer, and one of the great humanists
of the Western tradition." In this well-written and extensively researched
book, Marshall presents abundant evidence on behalf of these conclusions. In
the process he has written the most comprehensive and richly detailed work
yet to appear on Godwin as thinker, writer, and person.
The strongest point'in this study is the many-sided approach that it takes
in the depiction of its subject. On the one hand, Godwin is presented as a
major social and moral philosopher who is significant for his contributions to
libertarian political theory, utilitarian ethics, socialist economics, and progressive education. On the other hand, he is shown to be important as a literary
and cultural figure who embodies the difficulties of the transition from the
rationalism of the Enlightenment to the romanticism of,the 19th century.
Moreover, Godwin's ideas are consistently treated within the context of historical developments. Indeed, the book is highly recommended for its lively
and detailed depiction of the sociat literary, and intellectual currents of the
time.
The author's scholarship is exemplary. Marshall has an extensive knowledge of both primary and secondary works, and he makes excellent use of
Godwin's notes and diaries. He demonstrates that Godwin is important for
an entire corpus of works, not merely (as is sometimes thought) for one great
philosophical treatise (the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice) and one excellent novel (Caleb Williams). He defends convincingly the importance of such
theoretical works as The Enquirer and Thoughts on Man, novels like St. Leon
and Fleetwood, historical studies such as the Ufe of Chaucer and the History of
the Commonwealth, the essay on population, and even some of Godwin's
children's books. In short, Godwin is shown to be an author of considerable
talent and scope.
Marshall delineates the many dimensions of Godwin's life and thought in
a clear, unobtrusive style. He tends to avoid critique in the broad sense, and
refuses to confront directly the widely-debated theoretical issues raised by
such global perspectives as structuralism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and semiotics. For this reason his analysis creates the appearance of being a common-sense approach, and philosophical presuppositions are left quietly in the
background. Yet they are certainly there. For example, there is an enlightening discussion of the relation between ideas and material conditions which
could have been usefully formulated as an alternative to some varieties of
Marxian interpretation. Similarly, there is a wise abjurance of simplistic psychohistory, coupled with a sensitivity to the centrality of the psychological
dimension. Marshall's discussions consistently maintain a subtlety of explanation and a recognition of the complexity of influences. The result leaves at
times something to be desired at the level of theoretical analysis, but is always highly safisfying as an example of careful, discriminating scholarship.
One of the most successful aspects of Marshall's analysis is his treatment
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of the evolution of Godwin's ideas over a quite lengthy career. The chronological approach which is taken allows the author to interweave a variety of
determining factors, both personal and sociat in explaining the development
of Godwin's character and opinions. Thus, a richly elaborated account is presented of the influence of Godwin's family, his friends and acquaintances, his
educational experiences, his extensive reading, and his reaction to social conditions and evolving historical tendencies.
Marshall is quite illuminating on the sources of Godwin's ideas and the
development of his thought before the writing of Political Justice, a subject
often neglected in previous expositions. One interesting result of his examination of the genesis of Godwin's ideas is the view that his thought should
be situated primarily in the tradition of English Dissent, and only secondarily
in the Enlightenment. Recognizing that in the case of a voracious reader and
careful student like Godwin an attempt to place him simply in any tradition
is futile, Marshall avoids overstatement of his case and upholds the complexity of his subject. A good example of his careful analysis of formative influences is his assessment of the place of the Sandemandian sect of Calvinists in
Godwin's intellectual development. Among the principles of this sect, in
which Godwin was for a time a minister, were the centrality of the understanding in the attainment of truth, the superiority of morality to human law,
the subordination of individual property to the claims of common need, the
equality of all members of the community, the desirability of decisionmaking by consensus, and reliance on the force of opinion to promote virtue.
Marshall shows that each of these tenets is transformed into a fundamental
principle of Godwin's developed philosophical anarchism and utilitarian
ethics.
The detailed analysis of Godwin's evolving thought includes a judicious
assessment of areas of both continuity and change. For example, the discussion of his revisions of his greatest work, Political Justice, is thorough and
convincing. Marshall carefully traces the modifications of important concepts,
yet he skillfully defends the view that there is a basic consistency in outlook.
He demonstrates that Godwin's emendations represent the logical development of fundamental ideas, and the elimination of principles and language at
variance with his utilitarianism, anarchism, and determinism. It is shown that
by the third edition of the work Godwin has moved closer to immaterialism,
he holds a more Humean view of necessity, he emphasizes the feelings more,
he has come to admit some innate differences between human beings, his
hedonistic utilitarianism is made more consistent, he has weakened his opposition to marriage, and he shows more willingness to accept some aspects of
government as a necessary evil. Nevertheless, these changes are made within
the context of a fundamental theoretical consistency. In fact, Marshall impressively defends the thesis that there is an essential continuity in Godwin's
views from the first edition of Political Justice in 1793 through the late work
Thoughts on Man, which appeared in 1831. This effectively demolishes Don
Locke's contention in A Fantasy of Reason that one finds in Godwin's later career "a repudiation of the principles of a lifetime."
Marshall also presents a careful analysis of the evolution of Godwin's literary productions. He takes these writings seriously as works of art, and also
uses them to shed light on the development of the author's social, political,
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moral, and metaphysical concepts. The detailed analysis of Godwin's fiction
illustrates dearly the evolution of his sensibilities, particularly in regard to
the growth of his romantic tendencies. One discovers an increasing emphasis
on the emotions and feelings, nature becomes a more significant reality,
themes like isolation and alienation become more predominant, and more
highly imaginative plots and characterizations appear.
These changes are correlated well with the development of Godwin's philosophy, and both are carefully connected to the events of his personal life.
For example, there is an illuminating treatment of the influence 01- Mary
Wollstonecraft, the great pioneering feminist, who was Godwin's first wife.
Marshall shows that the brief period of his life that Godwin shared with
Wollstonecraft had a profound effect, leading to a radicalization of some of
his social views, and to an increased valuation of the feelings. What is shown
equally well is how much of Godwin's later life, which was largely filled
with disappointment, agonizing personal relationships, and financial hardship, caused a reversal of some of his attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions. A
key aspect of this somber side of Godwin's life, his relation to his daughter
Mary, to her husband Percy Shelley, and to others in the "Shelley Circle," is
admirably detailed. In particular, the tragic relationship of Godwin to Shelley, which combined intellectual affinity, mutual respect, and painful personal alienation, is well portrayed.
Of all the dimensions of Godwin's life and thought, it is undoubtedly his
work as a moral and social philosopher that deserves most to be remembered. Despite the high quality of his philosophical writings, he has never
been widely accorded the recognition due to him as a founder of utilitarian
ethics and as one of the foremost theorists of libertarian political thought. But
as Marshall notes, Godwin "provides better arguments than Bentham and
anticipates the best of John Stuart Mill." He correctly identifies Godwin as a
"thoroughgoing utilitarian," who created one of the most highly developed
and clearly articulated theories in the history of that tradition. The impressive
consistency of Godwin's utilitarian system is often overlooked by commentators who attend more to his rather striking conclusions concerning social institutions and moral practices than to the underlying theoretical foundations.
Marshall accurately explains Godwin's position to be a form of act-utilitarianism, and shows that at this very early stage in the history of modern ethical theory Godwin confronted fundamental issues (like the status of moral
rules) which are still the topic of lively debate.
While Marshall presents a strong case for the significance of Godwin's
moral philosophy, he sometimes exaggerates its merits. This is implied, for
example, in his comparison of Godwin's ideal of a society seeking to maximize general utility to "the Greek notion of individual self-fulfillment." Yet
the Greek ideal of self-realization, as expressed, for example, in Aristotle's
conception of the Good Life, or eudaimonia, is a much richer image of human development than that offered by Godwin. He certainly took hedonistic
utilitarianism to impressive heights, yet he is bound by the limits of that
perspective, which is committed to a narrowly rationalistic and excessively
individualistic view of human nature.
fv1arshall's discussion of Godwin's social thought also illustrates the merits
of his outlook. The comparison of Godwin to figures like Hobbes, Locke,
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Rousseau, and Mill might seem to exaggerate the former's stature. But the
text contains a powerful defense of the thesis that Godwin is indeed a major
figure in Western political and social thought. Marshall refutes Don Locke's
seriously defective judgment that Godwin is "unquestionably dead" as a political theorist by citing many of his provocative and well-reasoned arguments. While Godwin is neither, as Marshall suggests, "the first great
exponent of society without government:' nor "the Marx of anarchism," he
is certainly a towering figure in libertarian thought, and presents arguments
that have never been convincingly dealt with by advocates of the state and
authoritarian social institutions. Marshall also shows that Godwin, the great
believer in the force of persuasion and education, is a more significant figure
in the tradition of progressive education than is even the oft-cited Rousseau.
He demonstrates that Godwin is much more consistent in advocating such
libertarian principles as the "need for respect, honesty and toleration in dealing with children."
But despite the brilliance of much of Godwin's reasoning, Marshall is not
ultimately convincing in his efforts to minimize the problems resulting from
Godwin's extreme individualism. He admits that in Godwin's view "society
is essentially atomistic, nothing more than an 'aggregation of individuals/"
and argues that this view is coupled with a belief that "man is a social
being." But Godwin never truly reconciles individualism with the social and
communal dimension. In the end, his thought is one-sided, with an abstract,
inadequately social concept of the individual predominating. He has no conception of dialectical interaction or organic totality, without which a valid
grasp of the complex mutual interaction between the human personality, society, and nature is impossible. Contrary to Marshall, the theme of "communal solidarity" is never developed in Godwin's thought. True, he writes of
our obligations to others and of the inescapable demands of political justice;
yet, he remains on the level of individual acts of benevolence dictated by calculations of social utility. While the context is shifted to secular rationalism
we still confront a form of the Protestant vision of the individual believer
standing before a just God. It is also difficult to ignore the disquieting similarity between the calculating rationality of the altruistic Godwinian socialist
and that of the most egoistic Benthamite capitalist. Godwin exhibits little apprehension of the meaning of community, and no grasp of the grounding of
value in the social imaginary.
There are some areas in which Marshall does not hesitate to subject Godwin's ideas to searching criticism. For example, he pointedly questions their
adequacy on the issue of the nature of social change. He notes that while
Godwin contends that change is the product of the interaction between developing ideas and evolving material reality, he places too much importance
on the transformation of opinion, and never comes to terms with the need
for the simultaneous reconstruction of social institutions and power relationships. Thus, while he was a theoretical revolutionary, his reformist politics
were in direct contradiction to the requirements for breaking out of this circle
of mutual determination.
Like many figures who inherited much of the spirit of the Enlightenment,
Godwin was a firm believer in the myth of progress. In Marshall's opinion,
"Godwin's idea of progress combines a primitivist vision with a respect for
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the achievements of civilization." While this statement recognizes the complexity of the Godwinian conception of progress, it is ironic that Godwin
should in any way be linked to the primitive, for his sensibilities and his idea
of reason are in fact at the opposite pole. He always remains fully committed
to the civilized, and stays entirely within its bounds, even when he presents
ideas which challenge the dominant institutions of society (the state, patriarchy, and private property). His anarchist critique is often impressive, but is
inadequately anarchistic. He never comprehends the radical sense in which
realities like the primitive, the feminine, nature, and instinct place in question
the entire history and rationality of civilization, and, consequently, his own
vision of progress. His elaboration of themes like decentralized community,
individual rights, distribution according to need, and political justice are ultimately (for all their brilliance) divested of a certain critical force because of
his inadequate, liberal individualist conceptions of self, society, mind, and
nature.
But although Marshall might have said more about these lundamental
philosophical issues, what is of greater significance is his success in the task
which he chose to undertake in the book. He demonstrates that he has an
excellent grasp of Godwin as a complex thinker and personality, showing
him to be a man of paradox, and, at times, indeed, of blatant, unreconciled
contradiction. Not only was he the rationalist who struggled uneasily to
come to terms with romanticism, but also the theorist who often strove
vainly to put his ideals into practice in his own life. He was a writer of great
power, creativity, and accomplishment who was capable of unfortunate
lapses in aesthetic sensitivity. Finally, he was a thinker of enormous imagination and. analytical ability, who could at times succumb to uncritical, onesided abstraction.
For the reader who wishes to comprehend the many sides of this intriguing
figure, and to understand his considerable historical significance, this work
will be an invaluable source of illumination.

Loyola University-New Orleans

John P. Clark

Introspection and Contemporary Poetry by Alan Williamson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. 207. $17.50

Robert Bly: An Introduction to the Poetry by Howard Nelson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. Pp. 261. $
In his thoughtful and precise book, Alan Williamson negotiates among
three terms for the sort of poetry he explores. He rejects "confessional" as
too limited a term, tied to a specific and historically limited group or style,
and, despite his title, he talks little if at all about "introspective" poetry. Instead he concentrates on what he names "personal" poetry, an individualistic
poetry marked by "its willingness to set values of universality at risk, in favor of the authenticity of specific autobiography, or of the momentary and
the immediate, or of the deeper levels of the psyche." And though he is alert
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to the problematic nature of the self, even citing the paradox that as internal
states are made more describeable there is increased doubt about "the concept of an essential self," nevertheless he makes "personal poetry" into
something like a stable, necessary, and traditional mode. Williamson writes
criticism, I believe, more out of his personal responses than out of any intellectual or historical program or ideology. As such, he is perceptive and sensitive, and my only reservations have to do with questions of judgement and
the willingness to see stylistic limitations as not only necessary but willed
virtues.
But first, let us consider his virtues. His chapter on Plath is perhaps the
best criticism we have of this poet, and easily the best part of this book. By
arguing towards the "disturbingly universalized philosophical plane which is
the true ground of Ariel," he makes Plath a poet capable of turning amoral
psychic currents into something like a moral drama. Regarding Plath's language as a "reaction to, an absorption of, the shocks of reality" allows Williamson to connect the psychological and metaphysical points of view about
her poetry. Plath's fear of objectification (in Laingian terms) by others paradoxically turns her into a manipulative, objectifying subject in her own right,
and the ensuing struggle centers all of her poems. By wanting simultaneously
to exalt the self and to escape its burdensome presence, Plath becomes the
paradigmatic "personal" poet. Williamson's discussion of Plath overshadows
that of Lowell (whom he has already treated at length in Pity the Monsters)
and Berryman and Sexton as well, the latter of whom he correctly sees as less
successful than Plath.
From the chapter on Plath Williamson moves to consider the "middle generation" of poets such as Snyder, Wright, Kinnell, and Bly. These poets, in
his view, mistrust language and attempt to create an anti-personal self, a
mythic construct that seeks to escape a selfhood that is experienced as "internalized" history. The love of primitivism that so enraptures these poets can
be understood as an attempt to escape the autobiographical self and replace
it with simple but passionate "experiences of unlearning." Further along this
historical line are the surrealist poets, who write a conventionalized, periodstyle sort of poem that is increasingly "anti-epiphanic"; here the key figures
are Simic, Strand, James Tate, William Matthews, and Gregory Orr. Williamson is largely judicious here, though I think he overvalues a poet like Orr by
finding his subject of "traumatic repetition" the perfect focus for the surrealist style, rather than the numbed and narrow range of verbal simplicities I
take it to be. But separating the truly archetypal insight from the spurious
and stereotypical formula continues to be a major problem for critics of contemporary poetry. Williamson realizes that "sheer mental doodling, guided
by idees rec;ues, can be equated with primitive thought, simply because both
are different from civilized intellectual planning." Here the limitations of a
term like "personal poetry" begin to show, since many can argue that the
self is as likely to be clearly revealed by its doodles as by its intellectual
constructs.
Williamson continues with an excellent chapter on Ashbery, marred only
by several overly respectful references to Harold Bloom (Williamson's clarity
owes nothing to Bloom and profits not at all by defining itself against
Bloom's overheated attempts to enshroud Ashbery with canonical status).
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Ashbery is for Williamson both epiphanic and anti-epiphanic, clearly a personal poet, but also one who "identifies the state of imaginative ecstasy with
the point at which the object goes out of focus, multiplies, and dissolves."
This makes Ashbery especially problematic for those who read his work as
the "continuation either of Romantic faith in the imagination or of Symbolist
alchimie du verbe." The book's final chapter discusses several poets, chiefly
Bidart, Pinsky, McMichael, GlUck, and Wakoski, as working out of a dissatisfaction with the surrealistically colored period-style of those poets mentioned
above. Here the grouping has two parts: those who go deeper or who go
shallower when approaching the "mysteries" of the self, and yet both groups
are humble in the face of the self that the "confessional" poets treated so
brashly and relentlessly. Though most of these poets are still in mid-career,
Williamson treats them with a marvellous comprehension of their projects,
alert to nuances of development and shades of dramatic qualification. (Williamson's skill as a reviewer stands him in good stead as he responds to contemporaneity without losing his sense of depth and scale.) Again, I think he
occasionally turns limitations into virtues rather too generously, as when he
argues that Louise GlUck remakes her style with "a delicate complexity of
feeling" .in order to wt:ite an "absolute" poem (one stripped of all autobiographical reference) that is at the same time a distinguished "personal" poem.
Here the terminology is overshadowed by personal response.
For many readers this is a commendable trait, not a failing. And I agree, by
and large. But what finally makes me trust and value Williamson as a critic,
despite my sometimes divergent judgements, is what I would call his overall
literacy. He knows when to approach a difficult subject in a slant way, essaying through it with an impressive command of language, without falling into
obscurity or evasiveness. And he proceeds with a healthy portion of selfconsciousness, for though he asserts that "We also live with and through the
self, as long as we live," he acknowledges that the "truly mature mind lives
turned outward, in love and work, toward the world of others." This is a
book by a critic who addresses ethical issues in the context of aesthetic
achievements, without slumping into a moralistic stance or a merely formalistic retreat. He is unafraid to make judgements in the clear light of exposition, and he is willing to engage the intricacies of the self even while
admitting the enigmatic nature of the concept. His literacy consists in using
words like "personal" and "anti-epiphanic" with care and yet without a
blinding commitment to his own terminological invention. Our personal
poets have found a most personable critic.
The problems arising from the critic's personal response overwhelming his
or her language or intellectual framework are perhaps especially acute in
dealing with contemporary poetry, where the safety of canonical status is not
available as a haven against errancy in taste or estimation. The one abiding
threat is that the critic will come so under the sway of the artist that what we
get is discipleship, or even worse, echolalia. This does not happen with Howard Nelson writing about Robert BIy, but I often felt it impending. Here is
Nelson at his least effective: "Among the other poems in this section are a
powerful rendering of depression ... ; a fine poem on the necessity of facing
the fact of death straightforwardly ...; and a masterful quiet poem of human
grief and vulnerability.. "
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Now words like "powerful," "fine," and "masterful" seem to me more
than a little shopworn, and especially weak when used to describe poems
about subjects so overwhelmingly ponderous as those mentioned here. But I
don't mean to suggest that Nelson does nothing but praise Bly in standardized terms. However, even when he dislikes Bly's work-as in the one main
exception, This Body is Made of Camphor and Gopherwood -he does so in
terms that are hard to take as other than those of personal taste. Partly this is
due to Nelson not being especially interested in, or adept at, sharpened argument. For example, he mentions an extremely negative review of Bly, that by
Eliot Weinberger in The Nation, and one expects that this will be thoroughly
paraphrased and examined to reveal not only something about the case
against Bly, but also about the distinctive nature of Bly's poetic. This doesn't
happen, and we are left with a rather vague sense that many people have
firm suppositions that keep them from responding to Bly's poetry, but these
suppositions are not fully set out and evaluated.
The shape of the argument is weak in other places as well. In the chapter
dealing with The Light Around the Body, Ely's most famous book, Nelson suddenly breaks off to discuss Bly's translations. True, Bly's work as a translator
is important. And furthermore Nelson later makes a very good and intelligent case that Bly's Kabir translations had a strong effect on a later volume of
his poems. But the effect of the sudden break in the argument about The
Light is to weaken the force of the claim for it as the most significant volume,
in terms of public response and experimental fervor, in Bly's canon. Where
Nelson is at his best, I think, is when he discusses Bly's latest book, The Man
in the Black Coat Turns, and the main virtue here is that Nelson supplies a lot
of the background and allusions to poems that have not been that fully discussed by others. It is ironic that Nelson's strength shows best as a critic who
is informative, since I think he clearly wants to be a critic who insinuates,
who draws the reader into the feeling centers of the poet's work, never questioning too rigorously his ideas or challenging his deepest beliefs. Those who
dislike Bly might take a bit of schadenfreude in the claim that poets get the
sort of critics they deserve. But I believe that an intelligent critical case can be
made for Bly's work, though it means not relying too exclusively on formalistic or technical questions, and also not accepting too readily Bly's structure of
ideas. There is also the possibility that Bly's work can be used as an occasion
to discuss the course of postwar American poetry, or the very nature of the
lyric impulse, and there are times when Nelson seems to be undertaking just
this sort of larger argument. But finally I think where Nelson limits his effectiveness most is where he fails to see Bly's work-especially his polemical
criticism-in a sufficiently informed historical context. Polemic must be read
dialogically, since it is always a calculated response to some previous, usually
entrenched, position where an aesthetic has taken on the force of common
sense or natural law. What is then needed is an examination of both the entrenched position as well as the mechanics of the calculation behind the opposing polemic. Bly is a poet of deep feeling, but he also has a sense, partly
rationally constructed, partly intuitive, of how to go about preserving his
feelings against the current state of expressive habits. Nelson, to my mind,
does not see the calculation for what it is, and tends instead to read it as pure
feeling; furthermore, he slights the entrenched position, not in estimating its
worth, but in taking too lightly its historical force.
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Contemporary poetry is often criticized by people who have some stake in
canon-formation, but who cannot address that issue directly. Thus there are
many indirect appeals to historical schemes, common sense, taste, influence
and so on. When criticism deals with canonical authors all these things also
occur, but they have a different feel, they proceed with the texture of calm
mastery, as Cary Nelson once put it. It might be possible and even instructive
to follow the course of criticism on certain authors as they slowly become
canonized and thereby trace the development of criticism's self-assurance.
But without such a definitive master plan to follow, the criticism of contemporary poetry must proceed with some of the same pluck, nervousness, fog,
and illumination that probably accompanies the writing of most poems.
Queens College and Graduate Center, CUNY

Charles Molesworth

Victorian and Modern Poetics by Carol T. Christ. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. 178. $16.

Recent studies by Frank Kermode, Robert Langbaum, Harold Bloom, and
George Bornstein have called attention to the continuities between Romantic
and Modernist poetics. Now Carol T. Christ's brief but important book gives
Victorian poetics its rightful place in the historical argument set forth by her
predecessors. "Victorian and Modernist poetics do indeed define themselves
within a Romantic tradition which modern criticism has admirably described," Christ agrees. "But in emphasizing the Romantic premises at the
base of modem poetic thought, much literary history ignores the specific
character of the Victorian poetic heritage" (p. 2). By articulating "the continuities between Victorian and modern poetics" (p. 12) Christ fills a troubling
gap in recent accounts of post-Romantic literature in English.
According to Christ, Victorian and modern poetics have in common a distrust of Romantic inwardness and a desire to ground self-expression in the
world outside the poet's mind. "Even while they write within a Romantic
tradition, each of the major Victorian and Modernist poets reacts against the
subjectivity which he associates with Romanticism by attempting to objectify
the materials of poetry" (pp. 2-3). This objectifying impulse manifests itself
in three principal areas of theory and practice: conceptions of the dramatic
monologue, mask, and persona; theories of image and symbol; and constructs of myth and history devised to sustain long poems. Following an introduction, three chapters treat these topics, and a conclusion attempts to
account for the anti-Victorian rhetoric of Modernism. Christ refers to many
poets and critics, but concentrates upon six major figures: Tennyson, Browning, and Arnold in the nineteenth century and Yeats, Pound, and Eliot in the
twentieth.
By using dramatis personae and masks, the poet "at one and the same time
expresses and evades the problem of Romantic subjectivity," Christ argues
(p. 23). Tennyson, for example, "uses the dramatic monologue to control and
objectify the potential solipsism of personal vision" (p. 26), whereas Pound
uses masks "to objectify [a selfJ in face of the flux and multiplicity of experi-

Criticism, Vol. XXVII, no. 3, Book Reviews

329

ence" (p. 44). In linking her poets, Christ does not lose sight of the important
differences between them. She distinguishes the aims of Browning and
Pound from those of Tennyson and Eliot, and acknowledges that Yeats's
theory of the anti-self is atypical of Modernist poetics in its Romantic emphasis upon unified personality and agentive imagination. (Christ pursues further distinctions of this sort in Victorian Poetry for Summer 1984.) Having
made apt discriminations, however, the critic returns to her basic point: the
"evolution of poetic forms that separate the speaker of the poem from its
writer" shows both Victorian and modern poets torn "between a conviction
that the poem is inevitably a personal utterance and a desire to give it the
status of an object" (p. 17).
The same tension exists in post-Romantic conceptions of the poetic image,
Christ argues. "Both Victorian and Modernist poetics contain theories of the
image which claim objective validation for the connection between image
and emotion" (p. 54). Arthur Hallam's essay on Tennyson was important to
Yeats in part because it posits "a poetry of images, without discourse, that
unites sensation and emotion in an aesthetic complex that has objective validation" (p. 62). That there is an "objectivist strain" (p. 54) in Victorian poetics Christ has already demonstrated in The Filler Optic: The Aesthetic of
Particularity ill Victoriall Poetry (1975). Now she relates that "aesthetic of particularity" to Eliot's conception of the objective correlative and Pound's doctrine of the Image, drawing some especially striking parallels between
Pound's imagism and Ruskin's.
In her perceptive chapter on "Myth, History, and the Structure of the Long
Poem," Christ examines the internal tensions and contradictions in Victorian
and Modernist attempts to incorporate history into poetry. The poet honors
empiricism yet seeks in history a mythical design that can sustain the structUre of a long poem; he desires both "the illusion of an unmediated presence
of history" and "a teleology that gives value and direction to past and present" (pp. 124, 101). III Memoriam A.H.H .• Idylls of [he Killg. Sardella, [he Rillg
and the Book, The Waste Land, The Cantos, and A Visiol1 all attempt to represent "at once a historical process and an ahistorical pattern" (p. 108). Because
the subjectively intuited pattern needs objective validation, these ambitious
works marshal empirical fragments into increasingly discontinuous formal arrangements. Christ shrewdly notes the problems and paradoxes inherent in
such an endeavor.
The elegant economy \vith which Christ presents these important arguments is one of the most impressive features of her book. In slightly more
than one hundred and fifty pages she summarizes theoretic<J! issues of considerable complexity and provides illustrative quotations from a goodly array
of primary and secondary sources. Her exposition is spare but not oversimplified, deft but not superficial, selective but not meager. In this respect as in
others, Victorial1 al1d Modem Poetics is an exemplary study.
Tile UniiHr::.it~1 of !\inl' Mt':ric(l

